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CHAPTER 3
Beyond the Realignment Synthesis: 
The 1860 Election Reconsidered
Adam I. P. Smith
The Limits of the Realignment Synthesis
To the “New Po liti cal Historians” of the 1960s and 1970s, realignment the-
ory seemed to describe the circumstances of the 1850s particularly well.1 Th e 
election of 1860 (along with those of 1828, 1896, and 1932) became a para-
digmatic “critical election,” not so much, ironically, because it triggered the 
Civil War (which surely makes 1860 by far the most critical election in U.S. 
history in a non- jargon- laden use of the term), but because it brought to power 
the Republican Party for the fi rst time and supposedly locked in the new po-
liti cal order, defi ned by a diff erent set of issues than the one that had preceded 
it and with a diff erently constituted alignment of social and ethnocultural 
groups on each side.2 Th e realignment synthesis reinforced the working as-
sumption of the New Po liti cal History that long- term party affi  liation was 
the most critical factor in explaining voter behavior. Stability was the defi n-
ing feature of the po liti cal order in this view, and the 1860 election was “crit-
ical” because of the sudden stirring to life of voters’ hitherto supposedly latent 
agency.3 Since the 1990s, po liti cal history has been written in the shadow of 
the “cultural turn” rather than the social sciences, yet the language of party 
systems remains stubbornly embedded in historians’ portrayal of the 
nineteenth- century po liti cal landscape. And consequently, the core problem-
atic of antebellum history— explaining the origins of the Civil War— has been 
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dominated for nearly half a century by the concept of the breakup of the “sec-
ond party system.”
Th ere is now considerable evidence to show that electoral change in Amer-
ican history was more gradual and convoluted than the punctuated equilib-
rium model suggests, and that shift s in the fortunes of diff erent po liti cal parties 
 were to do with contingency and strategy as least as much as with structural 
changes in the economy. At the same time, rational choice theoretic models 
infl uenced some scholars to challenge the passive conception of voters im-
plied by the realignment model.4 In “the real world,” David R. Mayhew ob-
serves (correctly, in my view), voters must make judgments not just during a 
periodic realignment but “all the time.”5 Although, according to the realign-
ment model, 1860 was the decisive watershed between two stable phases of 
fi xed partisan loyalties, it would be more accurate to see it as one in a sequence 
of elections through the 1850s and 1860s in which party identities and voter 
loyalties  were malleable. Even the founding father of the realignment syn-
thesis, Walter Dean Burnham, acknowledged that the second party system’s 
“dramatic collapse” aft er 1854 “disclosed its essential fragility.”6 Th is is an 
understatement; the competition between Whigs and Demo crats was not only 
fragile; it was also fl eeting. If the second party system only coalesced in 1840, 
by 1848 it was already fragmenting.7
Most of Michael F. Holt’s work on mid- nineteenth- century politics has 
been infl uenced by the presumption that voters’ loyalties  were not fi xed, and 
that party identities  were fl uid.8 And from a diff erent angle, Glenn C. Altschuler 
and Stuart M. Blumin suggested provocatively that there was little more to 
voter engagement than the prospect of free beer and a hog roast: mobiliza-
tion strategies  were all.9 Yet, on the  whole, historical scholarship on the pol-
itics of the 1850s, and on the 1860 election in par tic u lar, has not yet taken 
account of the devastating critiques of realignment theory mounted by po-
liti cal scientists.10 Th e purpose of this chapter is to consider whether, in the 
light of the theoretic disarray left  by the assaults on the realignment synthe-
sis, it is possible to make sense of this election and assess its signifi cance within 
a larger framework.
Contingency
Elections are a challenging subject for scholars with a systematizing bent 
because it is hard to explain outcomes without taking into account contin-
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gent factors that can only be explained in narrative form. At fi rst glance, the 
1860 election may appear an exception to that rule: Abraham Lincoln’s vic-
tory in the Electoral College was comfortable and was widely predicted sev-
eral months in advance. “I hesitate to say it,” wrote the ever- cautious Lincoln 
in August 1860, “but it really appears now, as if the success of the Republi-
can ticket is inevitable.”11 Th is uncharacteristic sanguinity on Lincoln’s part 
proved well founded, as it turned out, but it was the product of a series of 
events that in themselves need an explanation. Most important was the sec-
tional split in the Demo cratic Party. Th e decision of the southern wing of 
the party not to support Stephen A. Douglas— the man who, back in the 
spring, was the favorite to win the election— meant that the 1860 contest be-
came, in practice, two parallel elections: one between Lincoln and Douglas 
in the North, and one in the South between the candidate of the southern 
Demo crats, John C. Breckinridge, and John Bell, who ran as a Constitutional 
Unionist.12 Only one of these candidates— Lincoln— had any realistic pros-
pect of winning a majority in the Electoral College. Th e refusal of southern 
Demo crats to back Douglas made it almost impossible for him to win out-
right, given the strength of the Republicans in so much of the North. Breck-
inridge, the strongest supporter of the extension of slavery, could not hope 
to be a serious contender in the free states— and even if he won every slave 
state, that would still be insuffi  cient. Some of Bell’s more optimistic sup-
porters dreamed of a national reaction against pro- and antislavery “extrem-
ism” which might sweep the old southern Whigs to power, but, realistically, 
with Douglas and Lincoln fi ghting to position themselves as the best de-
fenders of the rights of free laborers in the North, and Bell’s campaign lack-
ing any clear statement on what to do about the slavery controversy, he was 
left , in the main, with the support only of southern moderates who could 
not stomach Breckinridge. Given this electoral reality, the other campaigns 
seem to have been focused on preventing Lincoln getting a majority rather 
than on building one for their man. Even Douglas campaign newspapers 
devoted lots of space to electoral analysis “proving” that Lincoln could not 
amass enough votes to win, rather than to arguing that the “Little Giant” 
would do so.13 Although Douglas initially had hopes of winning New York, 
most po liti cal observers expected Lincoln to pick up the states Fremont 
had won in 1856 (plus Minnesota, which had recently been admitted and 
was, as Lincoln put it, “as sure as such a thing can be”14). Th e only question, 
then, was whether he would win suffi  cient numbers of Electoral College votes 
elsewhere.
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If Lincoln had lost in the Far West (very possible), had failed to win any 
electoral votes in New Jersey (very possible), and narrowly lost instead of nar-
rowly won Indiana and Illinois (entirely plausible), he would not have had 
the 152 votes needed to win in the Electoral College. And had Lincoln failed 
to carry Pennsylvania (which he did handily in the end, but which was by no 
means certain), his chances of winning would have been very slim. Maybe a 
less appealing Republican candidate— one perceived as being more radical, 
like William H. Seward— and a more northern- friendly Constitutional Union-
ist might have limited the very large number of northern voters who had sup-
ported Millard Fillmore in 1856 from moving into Lincoln’s column.15 In 1860 
a diff erent cast of characters may have infl uenced those crucial voters in In-
diana, Illinois, and Pennsylvania who, in eff ect, put Lincoln in the White 
House. Candidates matter, as politicos at the time  were very aware. Even given 
where things stood in August, Lincoln’s confi dence in his likely election might 
plausibly have been shaken if attempts to form anti- Republican “fusion” tick-
ets had been more successful. Where there  were fusion slates, voters oft en 
did not cooperate and split their tickets. Th is was one reason why Lincoln 
won some of the electoral votes in New Jersey that may otherwise have gone 
to Douglas. Had Lincoln fallen short, and the election been thrown into the 
House, it seems likely the Republican would have been blocked: Demo crats 
controlled eigh teen state delegations against the Republicans’ fi ft een in the 
Th irty- Sixth Congress.
And might the election have turned out diff erently had par tic u lar events 
not occurred? John Brown’s dramatic attempt to incite a slave insurrection 
at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 1859, to take the most important example, 
shaped the contours of the election campaign profoundly. Demo crats tried 
to tar the Republican Party with having fostered John Brown’s extremism. 
Th e Demo cratic Review charged that William H. Seward’s “Irrepressible Con-
fl ict” speech had “anticipate[d] the riot at Harper’s Ferry as inevitably as night 
follows day.” Lincoln too, with his “House Divided” speech, had launched a 
“war to the knife against Southern institutions.”16 Republicans responded that, 
on the contrary, Brown’s violence was an outgrowth of the lawlessness, vigi-
lantism, and “fi libustering” of proslavery forces in Kansas and therefore a di-
rect result of Douglas’s “pop u lar sovereignty” doctrine.17 Furthermore, some 
of them welcomed Brown’s execution on the grounds that it was a warning 
to disunionists of the consequences of treason. For southerners, both Bell and 
Breckinridge supporters alike, Brown’s raid was the ultimate evidence of the 
threat they faced from northern abolitionists. Th e prominence of the issue 
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in the campaign in both sections is a reminder of how the pre sen ta tion and 
re- presentation of dramatic and essentially “random” news stories can be pow-
erful elements in po liti cal discourse at a given moment. Had the raid not hap-
pened, the election would have been a diff erent event.
Musings about alternative possibilities could be expanded almost ad in-
fi nitum, but where do they leave us? Was politics no more than a series of 
contingent events, with the agency of po liti cal actors generating constant 
fl ux? Th e specifi city of the sequence of events that elections represent means 
that it is essential for them to be properly historicized; no determinative 
model can do full justice to electoral outcomes. Nevertheless, we can do 
more than simply tell the story. Th e signifi cance of the 1860 election is not 
what the proponents of the realignment synthesis claimed. Although, for a 
while, the Republican Party did achieve a majority status, this was a product 
of war and Reconstruction and of postelection contingent events. On its 
own terms, what is striking about the 1860 contest is the similarity of the 
Republicans and Douglas Demo crats in the North, and of the Bell and 
Breckinridge campaigns in the South. Rather than being the inauguration 
of a new po liti cal order, the 1860 election in fact exemplifi ed some key char-
acteristics of mid- nineteenth- century politics that are not captured by the 
realignment synthesis. Th ese  were (1) a po liti cal culture framed by republi-
can ideological assumptions about the nature of power and liberty; (2) elec-
toral behavior in which there  were underlying continuities in the orientation 
of regions and social groups toward par tic u lar policies and po liti cal styles, 
yet in which voters  were actively engaged in making choices, oft en retrospec-
tive judgments on perceived po liti cal per for mance; and (3) campaign strate-
gies in which “valence” issues  were more important than “positional” issues, 
in which po liti cal elites’ responses to events  were crucial, and which can be 
usefully imagined as a contest among competing narratives. I will take each 
of these characteristics of the election in turn.
Po liti cal Culture
Politics in this era, despite (or perhaps because of) wrenching social trans-
formations, was characterized by continuity in the underlying assumptions 
made about the nature of power and politics. A republican frame— fear of 
subversion and conspiracy; a concern with protecting liberty from monop-
oly and tyranny with manhood and honor— underlay most po liti cal choices. 
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And so too did preoccupations with the nation and with the threat from 
radical anticapitalist ideologies that testify to the embeddedness of the 
mid- nineteenth- century United States in a transatlantic po liti cal world. 
Th e continuing importance of republicanism in po liti cal culture ensured that 
Civil War Americans  were quick to scent abuses of power, to worry about 
conspiracies to undermine the liberties of the people, to fear the corrupting 
eff ects of partisanship, and to condemn a love of luxury or pretentious airs as 
evidence of a lack of republican virtue in leaders.
Offi  ceholders always faced insurgency from those who could successfully 
pose as “outs,” representing the people against the wire pullers of corrupt par-
ties. Republican electoral advances 1858–60  were due to their ability to pose 
as the antiestablishment insurgents as well as to their antislavery message. 
Like the Know- Nothing organizations that swept to dramatic victories in state 
elections in 1854 and 1855, Republicans claimed that their candidates  were 
“fresh from the loins of the people.” Republican campaign songs included the 
“Anti- party Glee,” which contained the line
I vote no longer for a name / 
pure principles are now my aim.18
Th e Constitutional Union Party also defi ned itself as the antidote to pol-
itics as usual (despite being led by a cobwebbed coterie of el derly ex- Whigs), 
denouncing the “spirit of party [that] raised its serpent fangs above them all.”19
In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville, absorbing no doubt the 
presumptions of his in for mants, made a revealing distinction between “great” 
and “petty” parties, the former being “those which cling . . .  to ideas, and not 
to men,” and the latter being driven by a desire for power and pelf.20 Like other 
nineteenth- century elections, that of 1860 was, on one level, a battle over which 
party represented great principles— such as the “eternal struggle between lib-
erty and tyranny,” as one (Douglas Demo cratic) newspaper put it— and which 
was merely the product of the “petty” schemes of “ambitious” or “fanatical” 
men. Th e Republican conspiracy theory about a scheming Slave Power was 
not just rhetorical window dressing; it was a powerful narrative, one that made 
sense of key events (the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, “bleeding Kan-
sas,” the Dred Scott decision, and so on). Th e Breckinridge campaign drew 
on similar tropes in its depiction of a Black Republican conspiracy to under-
mine southern rights. In both cases, a conspiratorial mode of presenting the 
world drew on a common republican po liti cal culture in which politics was 
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about binary choices, pluralism was poorly developed as a concept, and lib-
erty always had to be protected from those with power.
Th is was also the po liti cal cultural context in which anxiety about cor-
ruption was framed. A report by the Republican congressman John Covode 
on the corruption of the Buchanan administration was a widely circulated 
campaign document.21 Corruption of the venal kind was bad enough, but in 
a republican po liti cal culture the pilfering by offi  ceholders and the disrepu-
table reputation of parties and wire pullers threatened to undermine the 
Republic by draining it of virtue and honesty. In the Republican Party 
imagination, corruption scandals  were symptomatic of the existential threat 
posed by the Slave Power. Th ere  were two irrepressible confl icts, explained 
New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley during the campaign, one pitting 
freedom against “aggressive, all- grasping Slavery propagandism,” and the sec-
ond, “not less vital,” between “frugal government and honest administration” 
on the one hand and “ wholesale executive corruption, and speculative job-
bery” on the other.22
Electoral Behavior
In this, as in every election in the middle de cades of the nineteenth century, 
neither the appearance of new party labels nor the salience of new issues could 
obscure an underlying continuity in voting patterns. Th e Republican vote was 
strongest where Whigs and antislavery parties before them had always done 
well. It was regionally concentrated in New En gland (where Lincoln won 
every single county) and those parts of the North most infl uenced by evan-
gelicalism and Yankee settlement: upstate New York and parts of Ohio, Mich-
igan, Wisconsin and Iowa, plus northern counties of Illinois and Indiana. In 
1860 Republicans did especially well in comparison with their pre de ces sor 
parties in Illinois and Pennsylvania, states that had once been dominated by 
the Democracy. But the Demo crats remained strong among their traditional 
supporters— Irish immigrants and working- class urbanites (the only major 
city Lincoln won was Chicago), and non- Yankee- infl uenced rural voters in the 
Midwest.
In the South, John Bell won in traditional areas of Whig strength—in his 
home state of Tennessee, plus Virginia and Kentucky. He also came in a close 
second in Georgia and North Carolina. Confi rming his Whiggish appeal, 
some people supported Bell in the explicit hope that they might be able to 
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create, as one Virginia Whig put it, a new, national “conservative Union party, 
somewhat resembling the old Whig party.”23 But this was, in the end, a purely 
regional, Upper South project. In the free states, the Constitutional Union-
ists failed, on the  whole, to attract the support of former Whig and Know- 
Nothing voters; only in Massachusetts and the Pacifi c West did the old Whig 
vote gravitate to John Bell rather than Lincoln.24
Although in very broad terms, election results refl ected historic cultural 
and socioeconomic po liti cal identities, these underlying patterns did not de-
termine election outcomes, which  were oft en shaped by relatively small mar-
gins. Politicians did not take the electorate for granted. On the contrary, they 
behaved as if defending and attacking the record of incumbents would swing 
votes. And corruption scandals, the fallout of the Panic of 1857, and the gen-
eral sense that the nation was on the brink of disunion undermined the in-
cumbents, the Demo cratic Party that had dominated national politics for 
thirty years. Despite his reputation, James Buchanan was not a vacillating 
and feeble president, but, on the contrary, ideologically driven and activist.25 
His most disastrous move was trying to drive the proslavery Lecompton Con-
stitution for Kansas through Congress, at the cost of splitting his party, be-
cause he was convinced that only by acceding to southern demands could 
the controversy over slavery in the territories be “solved.” Th e Demo cratic 
Party may well have split anyway, since, as numerous historians have shown, 
there was a powerful southern lobby that deliberately maneuvered to this end. 
Even moderate southern Demo crats  were determined to settle for nothing 
less than a federal slave code that was anathema to, and would have been elec-
toral suicide for, the northern wing of the party. Nevertheless, at every stage 
of his administration, Buchanan took decisions that exacerbated the prob-
lem. And his loyalty to southerners in his cabinet meant that he overlooked 
the egregious corruption of men like Secretary of War John B. Floyd.
In the light of all this, many observers understandably saw the election 
as more a rejection of Buchanan and what he had come to represent than an 
endorsement of the Republicans. Th e New York World, which was not yet a 
Demo cratic organ, claimed in October 1860 that most Republican voters did 
not care “a broken tobacco- pipe for the negro question.” Th e cause of Lin-
coln’s likely victory, the newspaper suggested, was the pop u lar belief that “the 
demo cratic party has been so long in power that it has become corrupt; that 
it understands too well the crooked arts by which partisan pockets are lined 
at the public expense; and that it is safer to try an experiment with new men 
and a young party, than to continue a set of old party hacks at the public crib.”26 
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Chairman of the Demo cratic National Committee August Belmont agreed. 
“Th e country at large had become disgusted with the misrule of Mr. Buchanan, 
and the corruption which disgraced his Administration,” he wrote. “Th e 
Demo cratic party was made answerable for his misdeeds, and a change was 
ardently desired by thousands of conservative men out of politics.”27 Th e “great 
idea” settled by this election, declared the Philadelphia North American, was 
“the overthrow of corruption.” It made no mention of slavery extension.28
Campaign Strategies
Politicians’ responsiveness to voters intensifi ed sectional polarization by cur-
tailing candidates’ room for maneuver within each section. Since each party 
system is imagined to be oriented around a diff erent set of issues, proponents 
of the realignment synthesis stressed the “positional” (that is, distinctive, new) 
issues of insurgent parties. However, my reading of the evidence is that so- 
called valence issues (that is, points on which the parties agree but compete 
to present themselves as best placed to deliver)  were generally more impor-
tant drivers of po liti cal debate in this period.29 In 1860 the ideological divide 
(in Burnham’s sense of “highly salient issue- clusters”) within each section was 
narrower than in previous elections. On important matters of policy, Repub-
lican and Demo crats  were not so far apart. Douglas did not just endorse a 
Homestead Act, a Pacifi c railroad, and federal support for internal improve-
ments, all policies that  were championed by the Republicans; he claimed, not 
entirely implausibly, to have invented them all (although, to be fair, large sec-
tions of his party remained wary of all three).30
Both parties claimed to be the defenders of free white labor. Demo crats 
 were much more overt in their use of racism to warn of competition from 
freed slaves. But Republicans in Indiana and Illinois, where this was a major 
campaign issue, used similar arguments to make the case against slavery ex-
tension, albeit usually without the crude racism of the Demo crats. Republi-
cans attacked Demo crats for favoring Cuban annexation on the grounds that 
it would lead to racial amalgamation. One such article, in the Illinois State 
Journal, may, according to Lincoln biographer Michael Burlingame, have been 
penned by the candidate himself.31 As the Republican New York Times asked 
rhetorically, “How is the doctrine of negro equality to be ‘forced upon the 
South’ by the Republicans, when they scout and scorn it for the free negroes 
of the North?” Republicans do not “have any more love of the negro— any 
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greater disposition to make sacrifi ces for his sake, or to waive their own rights 
and interests for the promotion of his welfare, than the rest of mankind, North 
and South.”32 Meanwhile, northern Demo crats indignantly warned that if the 
consequence of southerners’ “bolting” was Lincoln’s election, they should no 
longer expect any support from northern Demo crats in returning “a ‘fugi-
tive’ which they have not a dollar’s interest in.” Douglas newspapers used the 
terms “slaveocracy” and “Slave Power,” coinages associated with the Repub-
licans, to describe Breckinridge.33
Both parties battled for the mantle of conservatism, with Republicans vig-
orously countering Demo crats’ claims to be the true Unionists. Lincoln’s 
hometown Republican newspaper made this its consistent theme. Th e elec-
tion, it stressed, was a battle between “conservative Republicanism [and] fi re- 
eating, slave- extending Democracy.”34 One of Lincoln’s supporters in 1860, 
a young ex- Whig, Manton Marble, later to become editor of the vocally anti- 
Lincoln New York World, was convinced that support for the Republicans was 
the only true “conservative” course.35
I do not mean to suggest that the diff erences between the parties  were 
unimportant. Especially in its New En gland heartland, the Republican Party 
expressed itself in a po liti cal style colored by evangelicalism and a long re-
form tradition that was at odds with the laissez- faire approach and tolerance 
of cultural diversity of most Demo crats. Almost everywhere the Douglas 
Demo crats proved much more willing to use the nastiest forms of race bait-
ing than did Republicans. And Republicans opposed all slavery extension on 
principle, whereas northern Demo crats made much of their candidate’s cham-
pioning of “pop u lar sovereignty.” Yet while these  were positions with diver-
gent legislative implications, both were— overtly or implicitly— antagonistic 
to the Dred Scott decision, and both  were expressed in terms of white set-
tlers’ opportunity in the West. Largely unnoticed by historians, powerful 
voices within the Republican Party even tried to neutralize the public appeal 
of Douglas’s policy of congressional noninterference in the territories by de-
nying that it amounted to a signifi cant distinction between the parties. “Th e 
great mass of the people in all sections . . .  recognize pop u lar sovereignty as 
a fair, just and safe way of solving a very diffi  cult problem,” acknowledged 
the Republican New York Times in July 1860. “Th e slavery question will be 
settled on this basis, whichever party may come into power. Th is is, under any 
circumstances, to be the practical solution of the diffi  culty.”36
Th e key to the Republican Party’s appeal in 1860 was its claim to be the 
most eff ective bulwark against an aggressive and destabilizing Slave Power. 
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Republicans presented themselves as the new broom that would sweep away 
years, if not de cades, of rule in Washington by a corrupted national Demo-
cratic Party that was betraying the interests of the ordinary free white men 
it claimed to represent. Th e campaign made a conservative pitch to restore 
ancient liberties. Th ere was a relentless focus in campaign speeches on the 
threat of the slave trade being reopened (this was mentioned by Lincoln in 
most of his 1859 speeches) and on Breckinridge’s policy, backed by President 
Buchanan, of introducing a congressional slave code for the territories.37 Dur-
ing the campaign, Lincoln newspapers reported random lynchings of north-
erners in the South, stories that fed their narrative about the barbarism of 
the Slave Power.38
Demo crats had presented themselves as the embodiment of the common 
man for thirty years or more, but in 1860 Republicans worked hard to co- 
opt this Jacksonian language for themselves. Republican clubs held meetings 
to celebrate Jeff erson’s birthday, and Lincoln was hailed as a “Jeff ersonian Re-
publican” in campaign literature.39 Republican campaigners argued that the 
“so- called Demo cratic party” was “false to its name” and was now the “aris-
tocratic” party, its support for slavery extension being in eff ect support for 
land monopoly by slaveowners, securing “power to the few.” Jeff erson and 
Jackson  were retrospectively enlisted as Republican spokesmen, since they 
had wanted to “give and preserve power to the people to enable them to be-
come proprietors and secure them in their homes.”40 Th e candidate’s care-
fully projected image as a “Rail Splitter” and as “Honest Abe,” as an “obscure 
child of labor” who was “an apt illustration of our free institutions,” was a 
core component in the project of presenting Republicanism as on the side of 
the workingman.41
Th e Douglas Demo crats  were left  with a problem of diff erentiation. Th ey 
too had the appeal of a pop u lar candidate who had made his own way in the 
West. And they  were the original party of the common man. Furthermore, 
Douglas’s campaign was at least as enthusiastic as Lincoln’s in trying to profi t 
from the anti- incumbent mood of the electorate through excoriating and of-
ten very personal attacks on Buchanan’s administration. Douglas’s po liti cal 
feud with the president allowed his campaign to try to outbid Lincoln as the 
candidate of change. In 1860, Douglas Demo crats, freed of their southern 
wing, ran against the Slave Power too— a high proportion of Demo crats’ cam-
paign speeches framed the issue as a battle between the Union- saving Doug-
las and southern disunionists. Historians have sometimes assumed that 
“pop u lar sovereignty” was a rather shallow fi g leaf for a policy that benefi ted 
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the South, but that is to underestimate the passion with which the Douglas 
campaign advocated it, on moral, economic, and nationalist grounds. So 
Douglas, like Lincoln, was presented as the defender of northern free labor 
values, with “pop u lar sovereignty,” an idea rooted in the American tradition, 
as the guarantor of that promise. What Douglas supporters tried to do was 
to tell a story about their candidate as the only true nationalist, the one man 
who could save the Union against “fanat i cism,” northern as well as south-
ern. Douglas alone, the campaign asserted, would not only save the Union 
(in contrast to the “recklessness” of Lincoln and the “Disunionist bolter” 
Breckinridge), but would also transform the opportunities available to white 
northerners.
Back in 1856, the Buchanan campaign had some success in painting the 
Republicans as dangerous radicals, and Douglas tried the same approach in 
1860. But circumstances had changed, the stakes now seemed higher, and 
the Republicans’ warnings about southern aggression seemed, in the previous 
four years, to have been vindicated. Douglas supporters, meanwhile, tried to 
use Brown’s raid as evidence of Republican extremism, but the charges did 
not stick, even with natural conservatives like Manton Marble. All the 
Harpers Ferry drama did, in the end, was to make it more diffi  cult for Doug-
las to deny the severity of the sectional crisis. Th e case for the Republicans 
in 1860 was that if, as a northerner, one wanted to defend free institutions, 
why vote for Douglas, who was compromised by his association with the 
national Demo cratic Party and who probably could not win anyway, when 
one could vote for Lincoln, whose anti– Slave Power credentials ran much 
deeper?
In the slave states, Bell and Breckinridge supporters each presented their 
candidate as the one most likely to defend southern rights, albeit through 
diff erent mechanisms. Bell’s story was that he was a wise statesman in the 
tradition of Henry Clay. Breckinridge’s was that he off ered a specifi c and 
supposedly fi nal plan to secure southern rights within the Union. A federal 
slave code would provide legislative backup to the Dred Scott decision; prom-
ises of Ca rib bean expansion off ered a way of building the collective strength 
of the slave states within the Union. Explicit in this story was the idea that if 
the North rejected these demands, and Lincoln or Douglas became president, 
the South would have been fi nally vindicated in its assumption that Yankees 
 were no longer prepared to respect their equal rights (by which they meant 
respect for slaves as legitimate property).
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Th ese campaign strategies  were, in essence, aimed at creating “narratives” 
that connected an image of the candidate to a story about what was wrong, 
who the enemy was, and how it could be put right. Th e task of politicians— 
whether party managers, editors, or other opinion formers such as ministers 
and pop u lar speakers— was to “make sense” of the world to voters, shaping, 
but by defi nition also being shaped by, voters’ understanding of who their 
friends and enemies  were and where their interests lay. Politics, especially at 
election time, was about synthesizing policy, po liti cal style, and underlying 
values into a plausible and compelling story. Whereas ideology is a way of 
describing longitudinal attitudes, it was the narratives constructed out of ide-
ological components that mattered at election time. Such narratives  were more 
or less compelling depending on context, events, candidates, and the eff ec-
tiveness of mobilization strategies. Politics, as Robert Kelley once observed, 
oft en revolves around the “dramatic imagination” of its protagonists.42 Th e 
drama lay in the acute consciousness of the choice confronting the nation 
and is oft en constructed, in a republican frame, around fears of conspiracy 
and threats to liberty.
All four campaigns told a story about how their man was best placed to 
maintain order and stability, how their man, and theirs alone, was the true 
protector of the legacy of the Revolution, the defender of freedom. Obviously 
the crisis over slavery, the threat of the Slave Power (to northerners), or of 
abolition (to southerners) was the immediate reference point. But the parti-
san po liti cal narratives in 1860  were given layers of additional meaning 
in  the light of the fallout of the 1848 revolutions in Eu rope. When politi-
cians talked about nation, revolution, freedom, power, government, the peo-
ple, or order they  were using terms reshaped over a dozen years by fears, and 
hopes, of social transformation and national transfi guration. So, for exam-
ple, the prospect of disunion was equated in the northern imagination with 
civil disorder, anarchy, and violence, while antislavery politics was associ-
ated by its opponents with dangerous ideas about the confi scation and redis-
tribution of property. When the Demo cratic New York Herald attacked 
Lincoln as an “abolitionist of the reddest dye,” the implicit reference to revo-
lutionary socialism was not accidental.43
Th e value to the historian of identifying the competing po liti cal narra-
tives at play in an election is that it focuses attention on the practical pro cess 
of po liti cal persuasion. It draws attention to how ideas, or abstract ideologies, 
 were framed and expressed, and how perceptions of events  were pro cessed 
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and manipulated. It cannot “explain” the election result in the sense of mak-
ing alternative outcomes impossible to conceive, but it can identify the under-
lying assumptions that constitute the sources of po liti cal authority, and 
therefore how changes to them have implications for po liti cal development.
Conclusion
Th e 1860 election precipitated a highly consequential shift  in party control 
with clear implications for public policy in some key areas such as banking, 
currency, tariff s, and, ultimately, federal- state relations. In rough correlation 
with Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.’s cyclical theory of American politics, the “outs” 
became the “ins.”44 Lincoln’s victory, together with the withdrawal of south-
ern congressmen as their states seceded, marked the ascendancy of a new 
group of men in Washington and the eff ective end of thirty years in which a 
distinctive Jacksonian variant of transatlantic liberalism had been the default 
setting in American politics. Since the Demo cratic ascendancy of the ante-
bellum years had also been, to a greater or lesser extent, a southern ascendancy 
at the federal level, the shift  in party control was more properly understood 
as a fundamental shift  in the sectional balance of power.
But the relationship between this coming Republican ascendancy and the 
election was complex. Th e South, as it turned out, was excluded from national 
power because of secession and war rather than as a direct result of the rise 
in the Republican vote in Pennsylvania and the Midwest. And although 
around 7 percent of the  whole electorate shift ed toward Lincoln in 1860, the 
party’s hold on these conservative voters was conditional. Apart from in Penn-
sylvania (where Buchanan’s 1856 victory was the last in the state by a Demo-
crat until 1936), Republican gains in 1860  were not wholly secure in the 
medium term, with Demo crats making big gains in the 1862 midterm elec-
tions and beyond (although Lincoln held them all in the exceptional circum-
stances of the 1864 presidential election). In 1860 the Republican Party was 
still a very loose co ali tion of state machines, not all sharing the same name, 
let alone po liti cal priorities.45 Even in victory, there  were constant expecta-
tions that the party would cease to exist in its current form and under its cur-
rent name. In 1864 Lincoln ran for reelection not as a Republican but as a 
National Unionist, which refl ected, in part, recognition of the continuing tox-
icity of the Republican brand in large swaths of the country outside New En-
gland.46 Just as the War of 1812 had—in pop u lar memory— led to an “era of 
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good feeling,” the Civil War, argued Harper’s Weekly in 1865, had taught 
Americans a valuable lesson: “Old party lines do not separate us. We are at 
the end of parties.”47 William H. Seward spoke enthusiastically of a “great com-
ing together” of the parties once the divisive issue of slavery was dispensed 
with by the Th irteenth Amendment.48 Expectations of continuing realign-
ment, in other words, continued long aft er the late 1850s.
Th e Republican Party that was ascendant in the late nineteenth century 
was “made” during Reconstruction, building retrospectively on its war time 
accomplishments to create a narrative about the “Grand Old Party” as the 
defender of the Union. A series of contingencies such as the assassination (and 
near sanctifi cation) of Lincoln, the battle with President Andrew Johnson over 
early Reconstruction legislation, and the Panic of 1873 all helped to forge the 
institutional identity and characteristics of the party. It is diffi  cult, if not im-
possible, as historians to deny ourselves the luxury of hindsight. But in or-
der to understand a po liti cal event like this election on its own terms we need 
to try and isolate what happened in November 1860 from how subsequent 
events and subsequent po liti cal narratives retrospectively colored it.
Realignment theory presented the 1860 election as the moment when the 
party system readjusted to the underlying social reality. I have presented an 
alternative formulation: like other elections in this period, although with 
greater consequences in terms of war and a shift  in party control, the 1860 
election was a contest among parties to off er the most compelling narratives 
about how to save the Republic to voters whose po liti cal values had underly-
ing consistency but whose partisan loyalties  were more fl uid. For a series of 
contingent reasons (to do with short- term party strategy and the impact of 
events like John Brown’s raid), the parties that gained support (the Republi-
cans in the North and the Breckinridge Demo crats in the South)  were those 
that most eff ectively dramatized the national crisis and off ered the clearest 
solution to it.
Given the underlying po liti cal culture, campaign strategies that relied on 
fears of corruption and conspiracy  were especially eff ective. As many histo-
rians have demonstrated, northerners did not vote for an antislavery party 
because they had all become abolitionists; they voted for the party that had 
the clearest solution to the threat posed by the Slave Power. Th e Douglas 
Demo crats tried to off er their own solution to the national crisis by using Re-
publican language about the Slave Power to show they knew who the real en-
emy was, and by presenting pop u lar sovereignty as the most eff ective solution 
to the crisis. But they  were also drawing, as  were the Constitutional Unionists, 
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on the “compromise” tradition, damning extremism on both sides. Th e bal-
ance was tipped against these compromisers in 1860. As is the way with 
most elections, the short- term losers did not regard themselves as having lost 
the argument, though, and, as events unfolded in the following years, both 
the Douglasite Demo cratic tradition in the north and the Whiggish south-
ern tradition felt vindicated. Th ey saw the 1860 election as just one battle in 
a bigger and ongoing contest.
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